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1. Introduction and some methodological remarks 
There exists a vast body of literature about nearly every aspect of the work of the Prussian 
philosopher and statesman Friedrich Wilhelm Christian Karl Ferdinand von Humboldt. The name 
of Von Humboldt has mainly been associated with the notion of Bildung, the foundation of the 
university in Berlin that now bears his name and the fundamental restructuring of the Prussian 
educational landscape in the beginning of the 19th century. This thesis aims to analyze Von 
Humboldt’s notion of Bildung, how the author used this central concept in the development of his 
theory about the state and how this theoretical outlook is related to Von Humboldt’s concrete 
proposals for the reform of the educational sphere. The research question of this thesis can be 
formulated as follows: 
How did Wilhelm von Humboldt use the notion of Bildung to limit the workings of the 
State and how can this theoretical program be related to his attempts to rethink and reform 
the workings of Prussia’s educational institutions? 
I will attempt to answer this question by first engaging in an interpretive enquiry into the notion of 
Bildung, in order to gain an understanding of Von Humboldt’s broader philosophical and 
anthropological aims and premises, as expressed in his earlier work. After this I will interpret Von 
Humboldt’s political theory through the lens of Bildung and argue that Von Humboldt mainly uses 
Bildung to justify his conception of freedom, his stances on the proper use of state powers and his 
attempts to articulate the juridical confines in which the state should operate. Moving on, I will 
analyze the relations between this general outlook on the powers of the state and the specific ways 
in which he tried to use this framework to justify his proposals for educational reforms. In the last 
section I will critically examine Von Humboldt’s attempts to limit state action through the 
deployment of Bildung and argue that this notion contains key elements that can be used not only 
to justify the position that state involvement should be kept to an absolute minimum, but this 
notion could be deployed as well in an argument for a more active state that should act in line with 
the core responsibility to ameliorate the conditions that enable individuals to lead fulfilling and 
flourishing lives. 
This research question is of relevance, because although there are some fairly sophisticated 
philosophical and more systematic attempts to elucidate the notion of Bildung and some 
interpretive and historical attempts to give an outline of Humboldt’s conception of the state and 
his work as a Prussian state official, there are very few critical assessments of the tenability of the 
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central conclusions Von Humboldt draws from the commitment to Bildung.1 Since the concept of 
Bildung is still being deployed in many contemporary discussions about the relations between the 
individual, society, politics and education, this approach can add a historical and critical dimension 
to these present-day discourses. Recent events have shown that Bildung, as a concept, never really 
disappeared from the public scene. When Martin Schulz, the leader of the German social-
                                                     
1 Rather sophisticated theoretical exposés of the notion of Bildung can be found in the following works: 
Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 
1790-1800 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 111-137; Frederick C. Beiser, The 
Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 88-105; Eduard Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee (Berlin: Verlag Von 
Reuther & Reichard, 1909), 1-38. Both authors have a slight tendency to place more weight on the concept 
of Bildung as an ideal that refers directly back to the Platonic tradition. While there certainly can be found 
many elements in Von Humboldt’s concept of Bildung that can be dubbed ‘Platonic’, like the veneration of 
the “power of contemplation or intellectual intuition” (Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, 102-103.) – e.g.:  the 
ability to synthesize disparate experiences through the deployment of the highest human faculty –, the 
similarities and intellectual affinities should not be overstated. I will not elaborate further upon the affinities 
between Plato and Von Humboldt here, but for now it suffices to say that Von Humboldt called for a 
certain degree of distance between and diversity of individuals, something that would undermine an overtly 
monistic-idealistic interpretation of Von Humboldt. One example of a developed critique of Bildung can 
be found in the last chapter of: Wilhelm Richter, Der Wandel des Bildungsgedankens: Die Brüder Von Humboldt, 
das Zeitalter der Bildung und die Gegenwart (Berlin: Colloquium, 1971). This critique is directed towards the 
historical appropriations and modifications of the concept of Bildung; in other words: Richter diverted his 
attention towards the outward development of Bildung as a social phenomenon. He thus was able to ask 
questions about the tenability of the generalist worldview that seems to undergird the notion of Bildung in 
light of the increasingly massive dissemination of opportunities to gain new knowledge, social differentiation 
and scientific specialization. (Ibid., 73-76.) The approach developed in this thesis differs from Richter’s 
approach in the sense that I will develop a more ‘internalistic’ approach to Bildung as a normative and 
political ideal, that is: I will limit myself to the analysis and evaluation of the concept, on the basis of endemic 
criteria and principles; presuppositions that are either present in the life or in the works of Von Humboldt. 
There are several other articles whose authors purport to offer criticism of the notion of Bildung from a 
more theoretical perspective, such as: John F. Michael, "Man’s Potential: Views of J. F. Lincoln and Wilhelm 
von Humboldt," Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology 8, no. 2 (1988): 23-26. This short article, however, 
departs from the misleading notion that Von Humboldt introduced the notion of Bildung as a way to 
conceptualize economic productivity and instrumental success. Von Humboldt was primarily concerned with 
freedom in a much broader sense and criticized overtly narrow attempts to define the human in purely 
economic and instrumental terms. 
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democratic party (SPD), announced his plans to create a “Nationale Bildungsallianz” and when he 
proclaimed that he wanted to make Germany “Bildungs- und Qualifizierungsland Nummer eins in 
Europa”, he evoked, knowingly or unknowingly, a rich tradition of writing and thinking about the 
relation between politics and Bildung.2 An analysis of Von Humboldt’s conception of Bildung, 
could very well serve as a critical mirror that can aid contemporary interlocutors to figure out the 
strengths and the weaknesses of their own conception of Bildung.   
In this thesis I will reconstruct Von Humboldt arguments concerning Bildung and the state and 
give critical commentary along the way. Furthermore, debates surrounding Von Humboldt’s views 
on education have mainly been guided by interpretations of the short essay that bears the title Über 
die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin.3 In this thesis I want to 
show that the main concerns of Von Humboldt, as expressed in this Denkschrift, were not mere 
whims, but rather stand in thematic relations to his earlier work on the limits of the state. If this 
seminal essay is read through the lens of his more extensive work on government – the seminal 
essay consists of about ten pages, yet it is “perhaps the most discussed document in the modern 
history of universities”4 –, then the legacy of Von Humboldt can be reassessed in a more integrative 
way and on its own terms. The aims of this thesis are therefore not only historical, but critical and 
evaluative as well. 
Reading a historical author can pose some problems, because it is not always clear whether the 
analytical frameworks that are used are indeed suitable to the idioms of the sources at hand. In this 
thesis I will favor a contextual and historically informed reading strategy. This strategy is modeled 
on the notion of Bildung itself. The concept of the harmonious development of all human faculties 
can be, as I will explain later, used to emphasize the need for a relational approach to the formation 
of subjectivity; to prevent one facet from overtaking, one has to balance the scales. This inherently 
                                                     
2 Jakob Schulz, “Schulz: Deutschland muss Bildungsland Nummer eins warden,” August 28, 2017, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/spd-kanzlerkandidat-schulz-deutschland-muss-bildungsland-
nummer-eins-werden-1.3644106 (accessed on August 29, 2017). 
3 See for instance the following passages: José Carlos Souza Araújo, “O projeto de Humboldt (1767-1835) 
como fundamento da pedagogia universitária,” Aprender - Caderno de Filosofia e Psicologia da Educação 7, no. 12 
(2009): 65-81; Thorsten Nybom, “The Humboldt Legacy: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of 
the European University,” Higher Education Policy 16 (2003): 141-159.  
4 Björn Wittrock cited in: Sylvia Palatschek, “Die Erfindung der Humboldtschen Universität: Die 
Konstruktion der deutschen Universitätsidee in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts,” Historische 
Anthropologie 10, no. 2 (2002): 187. 
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relational aspect of the imperative to harmonize subjectivity can be translated into a recursive 
methodological approach to Von Humboldt’s works, in which the texts are not immune to the 
course of history, but stand in rhetorical and critical relationships to the historical context. A merit 
of this interpretative technique in the context of this thesis is that Von Humboldt’s works can be 
relatively easily translated into general thematic concerns and intellectual dispositions, instead of 
taking his words at face value. It has to be noted that although this approach is relational, it is not 
radically relativistic. One of the key assumptions behind this approach is that although meanings can 
shift and even do so in unexpected ways, the possibilities of semantic extensions are far from 
infinite. I make this key assumption, because this is a safeguard against arbitrary and ad hoc 
interpretations. Thus, when Von Humboldt labels the care for the physical well-being of citizens 
by the state “the worst kind of despotism [my translation]”, we can read this remark as a rhetorical 
critique of a one-sided political articulation of human nature.5 Within this ‘vulgar’ utilitarian 
                                                     
5 In the essay that bears the title Ideen über Staatsverfassung, durch die neue Französische Constitution veranlasst Von 
Humboldt even states that the principle that states ought to concern themselves with the care for the 
physical well-being of its citizens leads to the “ärgste und drükkendste Despotismus” (worst and most 
pressing despotism), because people would deem themselves to be free, without actually being it. Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), 
39-40. This is rather remarkable, because only two years before the publication of this essay Von Humboldt 
wrote in a diary entry for the 11th of August, under the influence of Campe, that the most important activity 
of the state is the care for the “physischen Bedürfnisse der Untertanen”. He hinted at a utilitarian 
justification for this focus on physical well-being; in countries with “ein allgemeiner Wohlstand”, there 
would be less crime. (Wilhelm von Humboldt, cited in: Dietrich Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 
Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 114 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 38.) In August 1791, Von 
Humboldt wrote, in a letter to Gentz, that the state should only be concerned with the “Sicherheit” of its 
citizens. What could explain such a sudden shift in focus and perspective? Spitta seems to suggest that a 
conversation about the kinds of actions for which individuals deserve some form of punishment with a 
professor called Ith and Von Humboldt’s encounter with his ex-teacher Dohm earlier that year contributed 
to this change of mind. Ibid., 35-39. Whatever the reason behind this change might have been, it has to be 
remarked here that both before and after the change in perspective, Von Humboldt justified his conception 
of the role of the state through the deployment of the concept of freedom. In his encounter with Dohm, 
he suggested that the limitation of state activity to the safeguarding of Sicherheit would be unnecessary, 
because the state would have other means to protect “uneingeschränkte Freiheit”. Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
cited in: ibid., 35. This passage shows that Humboldt might have changed his mind about the means that are 
necessary to achieve a certain goal, freedom in the truest sense of the word, and not about this underlying 
goal itself. If this is true and if it makes sense to say that Von Humboldt’s notion of Bildung was designed 
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framework, supported by the French philosophes and the enlightened despot Frederic II, the main 
responsibility is to provide for the physical well-being of its citizens. The citizens who live under a 
regime that adopts such a crude strand of utilitarianism, are addressed as material beings, whose 
well-being solely relies on the possession of material means. Von Humboldt thought that human 
beings partly transcend and ought to supersede the material side of existence, through a spiritual 
integration of diverse inclinations and experiences. According to Von Humboldt, the “one-sided” 
utilitarian focus on the advancement of the physical well-being of individuals created an imbalance 
in the process of self-development. His insistence on spiritual development can be read against this 
background and as a corrective to the utilitarian approaches of some of his contemporaries. 
2. How is the notion of Bildung characterized in the works of Von Humboldt? 
 
A recurring difficulty in the history of ideas is that it is not always clear which specific positions are 
held by the author(s) and thinker(s) under discussion. In the case of Von Humboldt, a very prolific 
author and a renowned politician, it seems particularly important to ask oneself which aspect of his 
legacy one should highlight, depending on the question one wants to see answered and the themes 
one wants to discuss. In this thesis I mainly want to focus on his writings about politics and about 
Bildung. I chose to primarily draw on the short text Theorie der Bildung des Menschen and a work that 
has been published early in the life of Von Humboldt: the relatively short treatise Ideen zu einem 
Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu Bestimmen.6 I will discuss examples from the Ideen 
and make an occasional detour through other texts. Especially the short text Theorie der Bildung des 
Menschen seems like a promising place to find auxiliary passages that can be utilized to augment our 
understanding of Von Humboldt’s main concerns, as expressed in the Ideen. In both these texts we 
can find very concise practical and theoretical formulations of Von Humboldt’s conception of 
Bildung. These two texts have been produced in the same period and the meaning of the concept 
of Bildung remained roughly the same.7 When these texts are read together, a fairly extensive and 
multi-faceted picture of Bildung emerges.  
                                                     
to conceptualize freedom in the most fundamental way, it can be argued that his earlier works already 
contained the seeds of his later work on Bildung. 
6 When referring to the Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen, I will use the 
abbreviation ‘Ideen’. 
7 The publication date of the ‘Bruchstück’ Theorie der Bildung des Menschen is not entirely certain, but good 
estimations can be found in these two texts: Clemens Menze, Die Bildungsreform Wilhelm von Humboldts 
(Hannover: Schroedel, 1975), 22; Dietrich Benner, Wilhelm von Humboldts Bildungstheorie: Eine 
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This thesis will mainly look at the political implications of Von Humboldt’s conception of Bildung, 
yet it has to be realized that Von Humboldt attributed much broader anthropological and 
metaphysical significations to the notion of Bildung. The second chapter of the Ideen starts with a 
very clear and concise definition of Bildung that captures this wide scope. It is worth it to look at 
it in some detail: “Der wahre Zweck des Menschen, nicht der, welchen die wechselnde Neigung, 
sondern welchen die ewig unveränderliche Vernunft ihm vorschreibt – ist die höchste und 
proportionirlichste Bildung seiner Kräfte zu einem Ganzen. Zu dieser Bildung ist Freiheit die erste, 
und unerlässliche Bedingung. Allein ausser der Freiheit, erfordert die Entwickelung der 
menschlichen Kräfte noch etwas anderes, obgleich mit der Freiheit eng verbundenes, 
Mannigfaltigkeit der Situationen. Auch der freieste und unabhängigste Mensch in einförmige Lagen 
versetzt, bildet sich minder aus.”8 The passage starts with describing Bildung as the true goal of 
humans, which is dictated by “eternally unchanging reason [my translation]”, that stands opposed 
to changing inclinations. So what is Bildung, according to Von Humboldt? It is the free and 
harmonious development of human powers in the context of a multiplicity of situations. A 
multiplicity of situations is a prerequisite for Bildung, since, and this is a hidden premise behind 
Von Humboldt’s definition, situations which are very much alike do not incite a very proportional 
cultivation of human powers and, by nature, favor some traits above others. It is important to note 
that Von Humboldt did not intend to create a simple recipe for self-development that holds for 
everyone and everywhere in the same way. The development of powers is always the development 
of specific powers that actually belong to specific human beings, e.g. individuals.9 Eduard Spranger 
underscores this when he notes that for Von Humboldt Bildung manifested itself in his marital 
relationship with Carolina von Dacheröden.10 Von Humboldt spent ample attention to the concept 
                                                     
problemgeschichtliche Studie zum Begründungszusammenhang neuzeitlicher Bildungsreform (München: Weinheim, 1990), 
79. Menze asserts that the piece was published in the period between the years 1793-1795 and Benner dates 
the publication back to 1794-1795. The works were produced just before their publication. Von Humboldt 
finished his Ideen in 1792, see: Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 42. I am not aware of any textual 
evidence of fundamental changes in Von Humboldt’s theoretical outlook on Bildung in the period between 
the estimated dates of publication, so I will assume that there is a lot of continuity between these pieces and 
that the meaning of Bildung remained roughly the same. 
8 Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume, 64. 
9 Von Humboldt deployed the notion of Bildung both when he was writing about individuals and when he 
was writing about “Kultur”.  
10 Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee, 44-48. It becomes clear from the passages that 
Spranger quotes that Von Humboldt thought that Bildung is attained through nurturing personal relations 
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of marriage as an institution and as a means for moral development, seeing it as a potential vehicle 
of Bildung.11 Von Humboldt further joined a so-called 'Tugendbund', a rather intimate society for 
mutual support and encouragement, in which the members stimulated each other to reach their 
true potential.12 A quite clear and definite picture arises from these biographical facts: for Von 
Humboldt, Bildung was a highly personal affair and not a merely theoretical desideratum. Bildung 
can thus be defined as the free integration of the human powers, forming the specific character of 
the individual in the context of a multiplicity of situations and thereby confirming one’s 
membership in larger communal bonds. This might seem paradoxical, since this would require 
individuals to cultivate and foster what makes them into the finite beings that they are and, at the 
same time, to affirm their commonly shared humanity. However, for Von Humboldt both poles, 
individuality and commonly shared humanity, were not mutually exclusive, but rather necessary 
developmental correlates of each other. On the one hand, Von Humboldt was wary of something 
we could call ‘false and external universality’; the negation of individual existence through the 
affirmation of an abstract form that is not inherent to the spontaneously organizing human 
constitution.13 More generally, the general and abstract form as such is to be taken as a mere 
enabling and facilitating correlate to the necessarily open-ended process of development of the 
individual and not as the ultimate goal of human existence. On the other hand, individuals should 
look for ways to incorporate their individuality within larger communal bonds and affirm their 
humanity. 
These dualisms express a conceptual problem: how can the individual retain its uniqueness in a 
world that is much larger than itself, consisting of a diverse array of possible circumstances one 
                                                     
with others. The realm of intimacy is a discriminatory one, however, since the idea of an intimate relation 
would become rather vacuous if intimacy becomes a function of adaptability to random external 
circumstances. Or in the words of Von Humboldt: there exists a difference between the act of keeping 
‘uninteresting’ personalities company and reciprocally stimulating and enhancing each other’s “innere 
Freiheit”. See: ibid., 48.  
11 For Von Humboldt’s view on marriage, see: Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume, 78; 
Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee, 84. 
12 Ibid., 43. 
13 Von Humboldt even goes so far that he relates the outward imposition of an abstract form over the 
human realm to the vindication of nothing over something, implicating that his concern is one that bears 
metaphysical overtones; the negation of the concrete is the negation of the principle of ontological 
individuation as such: “Denn das Nichts unterdrückt da das Etwas.” Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, 
first volume, 72. 
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can be confronted with and of widely differing experiences? The articulation of the tension between 
Mannichfaltigkeit and Eigenthümlichkeit seems to do justice to the intuition that it is quite a complex 
task to maintain a coherent concept of the self in the context of the ever-changing, fast-paced and 
fleeting world of (social and cultural) experience and inclinations. The tension becomes more 
comprehensible if one realizes that Eigenthümlichkeit is not a static and unchangeable given and 
that it is distinct from being isolated (“Isolirtsein”) and living separated from other individuals.14 
Von Humboldt focus on the individual does not mean that we have to regard him as a proponent 
of a radical individualism.15 The full and substantive engagement with practical life is a prerequisite 
of Bildung and it presupposes that not only one’s own faculties need to be cultivated and 
developed, but that people also have to act with the cultivation of other people’s faculties in mind. 
Bildung can be described as a process that is intersubjective to its very foundations, in which the 
individual strives for excellence through a kind-hearted and moral encounter with the other. In this 
encounter with the other, the goal is neither to become more like the other, nor to lose oneself in 
the negation of oneself, but instead to open oneself up to the other, to facilitate comparison of 
character traits and, whenever it is needed, to modify oneself according to newly-gained insights 
into the human condition. In this reciprocal process of self-disclosure and reciprocal modification, 
the concept of humanity is given flesh and bone and individuals somewhat transgress their transient 
existence.16 The basic formula that can be drawn from this fundamentally intersubjective and 
contextual understanding of the development of the self is that Bildung requires a certain amount 
of alienation and distance from oneself and that Bildung is related to the process of becoming an 
integrated person on a higher and more enduring plane of existence.17 This process unfolds itself 
gradually and manifests itself in degrees, rather than in a binary fashion.18 
                                                     
14 Ibid., 82. 
15 I will probe deeper into this distinction at the beginning of the critical discussion in the fifth section of 
this thesis. 
16 Ibid., 236. It becomes clear that Von Humboldt sets apart humans from the rest of nature, yet wants to 
re-establish the connections between humans and humans and nature. Von Humboldt described cultivated 
individuals, for instance, as less “vergänglich” (transient) than plants, but at the same time warned against a 
too starkly accentuated opposition against nature and argued for unity with one’s surroundings (“Die 
Verknüpfung unsres Ichs mit der Welt”) (idem). 
17 Ibid., 236-238. 
18 Von Humboldt acknowledges that Bildung is not something that is simply present or not and that it is 
possible to speak of different gradations of Bildung – in his Ideen he writes about “immer höhere Bildung” 
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Von Humboldt showed that he was heavily indebted to his teachers that stood under the influence 
of the Enlightenment when he stated that humans, aided by reason, have the ability to critically 
examine and question the world. One has to make use of reason, for instance by comparing 
phenomena and critiquing oneself, if one is to attain freedom. Von Humboldt already clarifies the 
relation between freedom and reason in his early essay Über Religion. 19 He contrasts the machine-
like state of existence (“bloss maschinenmässiges Wirken”) with the free and bold individual who 
embodies “der Untersuchung, der Thätigkeit, der Stärke seiner Seele” and who is more than the 
circumstances that surround him or her. He associates the former type of activity with weakness 
and the oppression of all independent activity of reason and he typifies the free individual as 
somebody who takes decisions that are grounded in reason. The individual who is guided by reason 
discovers new truths and falsities about the world and takes delight in the newly gained insights. 
Von Humboldt thus links the exercise of one’s reason with the attainment of autonomy and with 
the intrinsic, non-machinelike worth of the individual. However, humans are not mere rational 
beings; they are subject to a wide variety of emotional experiences as well.20 Von Humboldt’s stance 
on these inclinations is double-sided. On the one hand he stated in the Ideen, in line with Kant’s 
categorical imperative, that if one gives free rein to one’s senses and inclinations, one might fail to 
live up to the standard of intellectual and moral perfection.21 Since natural urges can be strong and 
                                                     
(ibid., 57), “einen gleich hohen Grad der Bildung” (ibid., 58) and “einer fortschreitenden Bildung” (ibid., 
59), but falls short of giving a classification of different stages of Bildung. 
19 Ibid., 30. One could argue that where the earlier Von Humboldt stood under the influence of the 
Aufklärer, the later Von Humboldt departed from that tradition, thus shifting the philosophical attention 
on the reason of the individual towards the emotional spheres of human existence. While it is true that Von 
Humboldt later on critiqued the utilitarian and rationalistic framework of the Aufklärer, he merely did this 
to develop a fuller and less one-sided conception of character-formation.  
20 Von Humboldt recognized that humans are not passionless and lifeless machines, but at the same time 
he put forward an ideal of “impassioned self-control”. Numerous passages can be found in which he 
propagated this “moderate” ideal of emotional ennoblement. He stated, for example, that the only truly 
beautiful religious feeling is equally far removed from “Kälte” as from “Schwärmerei”. Ibid., 116. In the 
final chapter he writes that both the cold and generalizing application of theory to practice and the hot-
headed disregard for practice, born out of the reverence for the pure and unapplied idea, can have very 
harmful consequences. Ibid., 212-213. 
21 Von Humboldt wrote on several occasions that he thought that humans should strive for “geistige 
Kultur”, in opposition to striving to satisfy merely sensual needs. Ibid., 112-113. However, this should not 
be read as a deprecation of “Sinnlichkeit” per se. On the contrary, Von Humboldt wrote that “Sinnlichkeit” 
is a necessary condition for aesthetic experience and that the development of a harmonious character 
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difficult to resist, Von Humboldt’s optimism – as expressed in his thesis that, in principle, everyone 
has the capacity to ascend the cultural ladder – could seem a bit perplexing.22 Furthermore, Von 
Humboldt wrote that he believed that human beings, on the whole, are more inclined to do good 
than to act egoistically.23 It is possible to argue that this optimism about the ability to climb the 
cultural ladder that is possessed by even the “smallest individual” is completely incompatible with 
the non-trivial imperative to act autonomously, but this conclusion would be too hasty. The 
individual has to supersede natural inclinations and act reasonably, but the task is not one of 
ascetically negating all the passions, but one of integrating them into a larger whole. The formation of 
a well-rounded character rests upon the possibility of the power of the individual to synthesize the 
diverse strands of his existence into a harmonious whole; in other words: there is no absolute 
opposition between freedom and Mannichfaltigkeit. Whereas the ascetic negation of every impulse 
and desire would require giving up one’s concrete existence, Bildung only requires an ability to 
integrate experiences. It is clear that this ability requires a certain level of autonomy as well, but it 
seems to be true that this task is less strenuous than the task of ascetically denying every natural 
inclination. Bildung is not a trivial pursuit and requires a great deal of autonomy, but it is not a 
                                                     
requires “Geschmak”, a notion that can be interpreted as “ennobled sensuality”. Ibid., 136-137. There seems 
to be a tension between Von Humboldt’s appraisal and critique of Sinnlichkeit, but this tension is merely 
an apparent one, because this position is perfectly compatible with the idea that one should strive for the 
harmonious development of all faculties, instead of narrowly focusing and excessively cultivating just one 
side of one’s existence. 
22 “Keiner steht auf einer so niedrigen Stufe der Kultur, dass er zu Erreichung einer höheren unfähig wäre; 
[...] so verbreitet sich doch die Erweiterung, welche alle wissenschaftliche Erkenntniss durch Freiheit und 
Aufklärung erhält, auch bis auf sie herunter, so dehnen sich doch die wohlthätigen Folgen der freien, 
uneingeschränkten Untersuchung auf den Geist und den Charakter der ganzen Nation bis in ihre geringsten 
Individua hin aus.“ Ibid., 128. It has to be noted that Von Humboldt was far from arguing that every 
individual has equally developed capabilities, or that there do not exist stark differences between individuals. 
On the contrary; Von Humboldt reinforces a certain cultural hierarchy, in which “higher forms” or “steps” 
of culture can be clearly distinguished from the lower ones. The thesis that every individual has a basic set 
of capabilities that allows him or her to ascend the cultural ladder is not disputed, however. Von Humboldt 
took this believe in the possibility human progress over from Enlightenment thinkers, such as Ernst 
Ferdinand Klein and Christian Wilhelm Dohm. See: Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 14-17. 
23 Von Humboldt argues for this thesis by stating that even ‘savages’ (“Wilden”) cannot resist the the 
‘domestic virtues’. Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume, 143. This argument is not very 
convincing, since the category “Wilden” is left unspecified and Von Humboldt vaguely refers to the 
“Geschichte der Wilden”, without further elucidating this concept. 
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prima facie truth that it would be, from the outset, impossible to weave diverse experiences into a 
coherent whole, because that would require a completely ascetic stance. 
3. Bildung and the limits of the state: Von Humboldt’s theoretical points of departure 
 
Considering the quite substantial coloration of the notion of Bildung in Von Humboldt’s works, it 
might seem bewildering that he did not explicitly call for an all-encompassing state that could care 
for its citizens in every regard, independent of the circumstances. Instead, Von Humboldt utilized 
his definition of Bildung to justify his modest conception of the state. What are Von Humboldt’s 
main arguments for using the concept of Bildung to limit the influence of the state, instead of 
enhancing it? The clearest systematic exposition of Von Humboldt’s ideas about the limitation of 
state action can be found in the Ideen.24 In the following section I will seek to connect Von 
Humboldt’s notion of Bildung to the attempts to determine the limits and the precise role of the 
state in the Ideen.  
Von Humboldt developed, partly as a response to the utilitarian approach to governance, an 
account of the state in which the individual was a point of reference that sometimes had to be 
protected against the unwanted intrusion of other individuals, larger communal wholes and the 
state. As he wrote in the very beginning of the Ideen: “Nun aber erfordert die Möglichkeit eines 
höheren Grades der Freiheit immer einen gleich hohen Grad der Bildung und das geringere 
Bedürfniss, gleichsam in einförmigen, verbundenen Massen zu handeln, eine grössere Stärke und 
einen mannigfaltigeren Reichthum der handelnden Individuen.”25 If this passage at the beginning 
of the work is to be taken as a passage that adequately represents Von Humboldt’s views about the 
relation between the individual and larger societal wholes, one can conclude that although it is true 
that humans are social beings and that in order to attain freedom one needs to have a desire to 
cooperate with fellow humans in connected masses, the demands of society are, per definition, not 
                                                     
24 The central importance of this ‘mission’ becomes clear in the very first sentence of the Ideen: “Wenn man 
die merkwürdigsten Staatsverfassungen mit einander, und mit ihnen die Meinungen der bewährtesten 
Philosophen und Politiker vergleicht; so wundert man sich vielleicht nicht mit Unrecht, eine Frage so wenig 
vollständig behandelt, und so wenig genau beantwortet zu finden, welche doch zuerst die Aufmerksamkeit 
an sich zu ziehen scheint, die Frage nämlich: zu welchem Zweck die ganze Staatseinrichtung hinarbeiten 
und welche Schranken sie ihrer Wirksamkeit setzen soll?” Ibid., 56. The question of the limits of the state 
and its true aim was so central to the intellectual endeavors of Von Humboldt that he even proposed that 
it might be the most important question of all politics. Ibid., 58.  
25 Ibid., 58. 
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more fundamental than the plights of the individual. At the other hand, Von Humboldt recognizes 
the fact that individuals cooperate in “connected masses”, stressing the sociability of human 
existence. Another thing that can be learned from this passage is that sociability stands not opposed 
to Mannichfaltigkeit, e.g.: diversity. Von Humboldt was simply not an individualistic or egoistic 
libertarian. Von Humboldt only asserted that the state is not the sole platform people should use 
to manage their collective affairs and their common concerns. He fully supported the idea of 
mutual cooperation in so-called “Nationalanstalten”, that would secure “Einheit der Anordnung” 
and that would eventually lead to a plan-based and well-ordered structuring of the economic 
sphere.26 These organizations would be wholly independent from any state structure. The 
“Nationalanstalten” would not depend on brute force or a monopoly on violence, but on the free 
choice of the individuals that would partake in them.27 The membership of these larger 
communities would be wholly optional and these structures are not coercive, in contrast to the 
workings of the state. Only the individuals that decide that they want to partake in these larger 
communities are subject to its norms. In short, Von Humboldt acknowledged both the need to 
shield the individual against society and to provide at least a rudimentary sketch of the institutions 
that would take over some of the core functions of government, such as facilitating the encounters 
between different individuals in the name of a common good.  
This protection of the individual against society can be found along the acknowledgement of the 
necessity of the intersubjective realm for Bildung. In other words, we can find a qualified appraisal 
of both positive and negative freedom in Von Humboldt’s work.28 Roughly speaking, negative 
freedom can be understood as the kind of freedom that allows individuals to pursue their freely 
                                                     
26 Ibid., 92. 
27 Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 83-84. Von Humboldt stated that there exists an important 
distinction between institutions of the state and institutions of the nation: institutions of the nation are more 
dynamic and imply a greater amount of freedom to alter and revise the relations and contracts between its 
members. Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume, 92. 
28 Isaiah Berlin, whose name has been inextricably linked with this distinction, strongly favored negative 
liberty and repeatedly warned against the excessive intrusion on the freedom of individuals that comes, 
according to him, with positive liberty: Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty: Incorporating Four 
Essays on Liberty, edited by H. Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 169-181. Von Humboldt’s 
focus in the Ideen lies on stipulating the limits of the state, thus creating the impression that he was solely 
concerned with negative liberty, yet, as we have seen, he attempted to create a theoretical framework that 
allowed for the reconciliation of individuals and their surroundings, thus making room for freedom within 
collectives. 
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chosen set of goals without being hindered by external constraints. Positive freedom, on the other 
hand, can be understood as a (possible) state of affairs that allows a person or a collectivity to try 
to realize life goals and to act in a purposeful way. Although the kind of positive freedom that Von 
Humboldt espouses is a modest one, since Von Humboldt strictly separates the realm in which 
positive freedom is to be achieved from the machinery of the state, it is clear that he did not define 
Bildung as a purely negative exercise in abolishing structures that are deemed to be not conducive 
to the full development of the individual and that he attached a positive meaning to this concept. 
The limitations on state activity that Von Humboldt proposed should be interpreted as a means to 
make room for free cooperation.  
The state has a duty to protect its individual members by securing the rights that shield them from 
any illegitimate activities of their fellow citizens.29 It has to be noted that it is not the case that every 
form of activity that impedes people to freely develop their powers is deemed to be unlawful by 
Von Humboldt; only the actions that limit the individual unrightfully are to be prohibited.30 From 
this principle it can be deduced that the state is only allowed to prohibit an action if the law 
expressly forbids it. This is a formulation of the nulla poena sine lege praevia-principle that prescribes 
that the state only can act upon a previously established legal provision. Apart from the laws whose 
purpose it is to safeguard the rights of individuals from infringements, Von Humboldt 
acknowledges the existence of the “Gemeinschaftliche Recht” (communal law [my translation] as 
well.31 This field of law safeguards the right to have a say about property that belongs to the 
community, such as public infrastructure and non-proprietary natural objects.32 Von Humboldt’s 
                                                     
29 Von Humboldt defined Sicherheit as the “Gewissheit der gesezmässigen Freiheit”, which can be 
understood as a state of affairs in which people can fully enjoy the rights that should be guaranteed by the 
state. Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume, 147. 
30 Idem. 
31 Ibid., 159. 
32 The relation between the idea of individual and communal rights and the concept of property in the Ideen 
is a complicated one. Von Humboldt includes these actions that bar others from the “enjoyment of their 
property [my translation]” in the category of unlawful actions. Ibid., 146. One reason for the strong 
connection between property and rights in the Ideen is that Von Humboldt seems to have thought that 
property and the idea of freedom are closely connected; freedom is conceptualized as a necessary condition 
for property and property can unite the energies of the individual in order to achieve ultimate ends. Ibid., 
92. However, Von Humboldt also held the view that mere possessions are derivative of and secondary to 
the “Selbstthätigkeit” of human beings, since he thought that it is enshrined in human nature to engage in 
activities for the sake of themselves, rather than for the sake of the results of these actions. Idem. If the law 
 
17 
 
insistence upon individual rights is not a repudiation of communal property. Intervention of the 
state is justified, as long as it would facilitate the development of the individual and helps to 
safeguard individual rights. Maintaining a country’s infrastructure is a prime example of state action 
that is allowed under this framework. If the state would not be allowed to repair bridges and roads, 
these properties could very rapidly deteriorate and this would lead to hindrances for individuals.  
According to Von Humboldt, the state should be able to intervene if and only if a right is actually 
violated (e.g.: the illegal encroachment upon the rights of others), or to prevent such a violation. The 
corresponding set of laws that regulate state intervention in the realm of prevention are called 
“Polizeigeseze”.33 The state cannot use its powers in an arbitrary way to prevent possible infractions 
of rights, because there exists a class of actions that do not necessarily lead to the violation of rights. 
Von Humboldt distinguishes actions that lead to results that are likely to infringe on the rights of 
others from those which usually lead to an infraction of the law and from those that endanger the 
monopoly of violence that belongs to the state.34 He readily acknowledged, however, that 
preventive laws bring a conundrum with them, if freedom is to be preserved; to what extent should 
the state prohibit these actions that do not necessarily lead to a breach of the law? If the state could 
prohibit acts if and only if they would certainly lead to an encroachment upon the rights of others, 
the security of all individuals could not be guaranteed. If all the acts that possibly will lead to a 
violation of rights should be prohibited, the scope would be too large and this would possibly cause 
tensions with the nulla poena-principle and would be downright incompatible with the aim to use 
the state as a means to enable and enhance freedom.35 Von Humboldt gave the advice to steer a middle 
course in practice and that these questions about the precise application of the preventive laws 
cannot be answered by any general rule. In deliberations about the desirability of preventive action 
on behalf of the state not only the damages and the probability of a direct infraction should be 
taken into account, but the limitations on freedom that would be a result of the enforcement of 
the law as well.36 This provision creates a big interpretive space for the judicial branch of 
government and introduces the variables of time and location. This points to a recurring theme in 
                                                     
is understood as a means to stimulate the self-cultivation of individuals, it makes sense to protect property, 
without making the protection of property the ultimate aim of the law. 
33 More precisely: the “Polizeigeseze” deal with these occasions in which humans remain within their 
personal sphere and do nothing that directly violates the rights of others. The purpose of these laws are to 
prevent such infractions from happening. Ibid., 150. 
34 Idem. 
35 Ibid., 155. 
36 Idem. 
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Von Humboldt’s political writings: the general principles that are introduced are meant to be 
guidelines that steer practical action and they are not clear-cut recipes for success. The application 
of these principles ought to be informed by knowledge of relevant circumstances; theory and 
practice are closely intertwined. This raises the question about the degree of flexibility that should 
be provided for. If one could discard the guidelines and do whatever one would please, the rule of 
law and the domain of the state would disintegrate.  
One example of a case in which it is not only laudable or commendable to enforce police laws but, 
according to Von Humboldt, necessary as well, is the case in which anyone could take advantage of 
the ignorance of fellow citizens.37 As we have seen, Von Humboldt departs from the notion that 
individuals are in no way entirely isolated from others and that Bildung requires codependency. The 
corruption of fiduciary relationships that takes place when somebody exploits the trust of others 
undermines the very fabric of not only societal institutions, but of individual self-cultivation as well. 
Considering this, Von Humboldt proposed that the state should assess the qualifications of the 
people who intend to exercise professions that, by nature, presuppose trust in the expertise of the 
practitioner, such as medical and juridical professions.38 However, Von Humboldt, always 
concerned with finding the proper limits of state action, also thought that people who did not agree 
to subject themselves to such a test should not be barred from taking up these special professions.39 
The persons who would agree to take such a test and who would pass it, should get a ‘mark of 
aptness’ (“Zeichen der Geschiklichkeit”), so that it could be publicly ascertained that these people 
successfully underwent state examination.40 The main reason why Von Humboldt envisioned such 
a minimalistic protection was that he thought that a too paternalistic safeguarding of the well-being 
of the citizens of a state would lead to the inactiveness of the nation, through an artificial 
overreliance on the knowledge and volitions of others.41 Von Humboldt went even further when 
he wrote that this preventive action on behalf of the state should only be allowed if the nation, 
consisting of all the free individuals that have chosen to be a part of it, explicitly expresses its consent. 
In the cases in which the nation would not consent or would even object to such a form of positive 
action, the state should refrain itself (and if that would fail: be prevented) from taking action, even 
                                                     
37 Ibid., 152. 
38 Idem. 
39 Idem. 
40 Idem. 
41 Ibid., 153. 
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in the cases that would not raise any prima facie objections.42 One justification of the large role for 
the consent of the nation Von Humboldt gave was that rules are more likely to be observed if they 
would stem from the spontaneous activity within the nation and that the negative consequences 
on the character of its respective members would be limited to the necessary minimum.43 
Moreover, Von Humboldt thought that people would be more inclined to render mutual assistance 
if their ‘love for the self and the sense for freedom’ (“Eigenliebe und ihr Freiheitssinn”) would 
remain intact.44 Reliance on their respective consent is a sound way to make sure that people act 
upon freely chosen ends and not upon the dictates of the state, thereby reducing the risk of 
dehumanization and ‘mechanical’ action.  
According to Von Humboldt, interference of the state can lead to passivity and attitudes that would 
result in mediocrity. Those individuals that rely on the supporting and paternalistic structures of 
the state and not on their own abilities, fail to live autonomous lives.45 It would be misleading, 
however, to assume that Von Humboldt envisioned society to be a loose and chaotic patchwork 
of egoistical individuals that mainly act out of their self-interests, in which every individual would 
need to act as a discrete entity without any help from the outside. On the contrary, one of the most 
salient arguments against excessive state interference of Von Humboldt is that help from the state 
leads to a diminishment of the capacity of society to help and support one another.46 Von 
Humboldt thus reverses one common argument for the existence of a duty for the state to provide 
its citizens with material aid; the argument that it would be somehow inhumane or selfish to refrain 
from the use of the state as a (re)distribution mechanism.47 Von Humboldt’s claim that a state’s 
                                                     
42 Idem. Somewhere later in the chapter it is proclaimed that if and only if all the inhabitants of the 
communities that are directly subjected to the preventive laws would express their objection to them in a 
unanimous and explicit way, there would be a valid reason to suspend the police laws. So both the creation 
and the withdrawal of police laws require the consent of the nation. 
43 Ibid., 157. 
44 Ibid., 158. 
45 Ibid., 74-75. 
46 Idem. 
47 This ‘argument from compassion’ has strong roots in the Christian tradition and has been reiterated by 
many authors. One of the clearest and most heartfelt expositions of this argument can be found in the essay 
On Assistance of the Poor, written by the medieval humanist Juan Luis Vives: "Tell me, who act more humanly–
those who leave the poor to rot in their filth, squalor, vice, crime, shamelessness, immodesty, ignorance, 
madness, misfortune, and misery?–or those who devise a way by which they may rescue them from that life 
and lead them into a mode of living, more social, cleaner, and wiser, clearly salvaging so many men who 
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concern for the physical well-being of its citizens will lead to the weakening or the disappearance 
of the ability and willingness of citizens to help each other and form organic bonds of mutual 
support seems to imply that people would be able to achieve a higher level of development if they 
would support each other of their own accord. Von Humboldt argument only seems to work if it 
is indeed the case that people who are able to rely on state support will put less effort into attempts 
to realize one’s full potential by themselves. The key assumption that Von Humboldt made is that 
individuals lose the incentives to supersede themselves and to strive for excellence if the state would 
come to the rescue too easily. Since he characterized Bildung as the highest goal that a human could 
ever strive for, he was more than willing to bite the bullet and to adopt a minimalist conception of 
the state. 
4. The practical implications of the general notion of Bildung in relation to Von 
Humboldt’s activities as a statesman and a reformer 
 
Von Humboldt was not only a political theoretician, but was also involved and heavily engaged 
with the political currents of his own time. There exists a debate about whether he actually followed 
up unto his core theoretical commitments during his service, or whether he veered away from them 
on occasion.48 It is worthwhile to consider the possibility that the adherence to this dichotomy 
might be misguided, because Von Humboldt allowed for a pragmatic and practice-oriented way of 
doing politics in his Ideen.49 In these passages, Von Humboldt points out that the principles he 
stipulated in earlier chapters cannot be directly translated into specific political decisions, because 
history is in constant motion and asks for an adaptive mindset. A large place for concrete individual 
political judgment is intentionally left open in his theoretical framework. Political rulers have to 
decide, almost on a case by case basis, which societal changes are laudable and to be facilitated or 
sustained and which ones are not.  
                                                     
were formerly lost and useless?” Juan Luis Vives, On Assistance to the Poor, translated with an introduction 
and commentary by A. Tobriner (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 51. 
48 Spitta is a proponent of the view that Von Humboldt remained very consistent and true to his principles. 
See: Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 9-13. Others have argued that especially his reform of the 
educational system in Germany at the time stood opposed to his calls for a very minimal state, see for 
example: Joachim Siegfried August Kaehler, Wilhelm v. Humboldt und der Staat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
deutscher Lebensgestaltung um 1800 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 228. 
49 Von Humboldt tackled the question about the relationship between theory and practice most poignantly 
in the very last chapter of his early tractate on the limitations of state powers.  
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This does not mean that Von Humboldt advocated a radically relativistic approach to politics. Von 
Humboldt opposed the censorship laws of his time on principle and argued on multiple occasions 
for religious tolerance and supported his views with essentially moral and principled arguments.50 
His policy proposals and his views on the political events of the day were very much indebted to 
his philosophical thought. Although the principles of balance and perfectibility played very 
important roles in his works and private life, he did not shy away from critiquing the powers-that-
be, if he thought it was necessary. His dedication to the advancement of freedom led him to a 
condemnation of the so-called ‘Zensuredikten’ and the ‘Karlsbader Beschlüsse’ – a set of decrees 
that severely limited the freedom of speech of citizens – and espoused a more liberal conception 
of the relation of religion and the state that put him at odds with the ultraconservative forces within 
the administrations lead by, respectively, Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein and Karl 
August von Hardenberg.51 There are many other occasions in which Von Humboldt stood up for 
his principles. He gave impassioned pleas for the freedom of thought and the freedom of 
expression. Even more relevant for the main issue at hand is that Von Humboldt seemed to be 
willing to restructure institutions according to his insights into what he perceived to be the 
necessary conditions for Bildung. For example, his thesis that human beings are not isolated 
individuals and come into fruition within layers of sociability comes to the fore in his proposals for 
the reform of the Prussian education system and for the restructuring of the governing structure 
of Prussia as a whole. In his Denkschrift Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren 
wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin he famously argued for the creation of a research community in 
which both students and professors reap the benefits of the free exchange of ideas and insights 
and in which research and education are closely intertwined.52 Students were not only to be passive 
spectators that would passively acquiesce ‘true knowledge’ from their superiors, they should 
actively participate in academic endeavors, within the context of the larger scientific community.53 
Von Humboldt tried to incorporate the principles of amicability and collegiality into the Prussian 
government by the founding a special administrative council (Staatsrat) that would need to have 
                                                     
50 He cited freedom and the principle of toleration in the field of religion as reasons to oppose the reactionary 
edict of Wöllner. See: Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 30-31.  
51 Ibid., 60 and ibid., 137. 
52 Gerd Hohendorf, "Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835)," Prospects 23, no. 3 (1993): 665-673. 
53 Ibid., 675. 
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some very strictly defined juridical standing within the general administration.54 Given Von 
Humboldt’s involvement in the educational reforms of the time, it would not be an exaggeration 
to assert that Von Humboldt, despite his insistence on his idea of the ‘limited state’, intended to 
create the conditions under which the nation could blossom with the help of the state. 
Von Humboldt’s views on the possibility of reforms through political means was very much shaped 
by the historical context of his day. Although Von Humboldt was a critical observer of the events 
that took place during the French revolution, he subscribed to a lot of the ideals and values that 
were put forward by its principal intellectual standard-bearers. His support for the idea that every 
citizen ought to be free, his criticism of absolute monarchy and his adherence to the idea that it is 
possible to reform society through appropriate political action, remained consistently strong in his 
works and during his service as a Prussian state official. Both Von Humboldt concrete proposals 
for reform and his more theoretical and systematic work can be, in a very general way, be 
understood as an attempt to come to a reckoning between the positive legacy of the Enlightenment 
and its excesses and develop the result into both theory and practice.55 Concretely, Von Humboldt 
tried to reform Prussian society, not through a subversive restructuring of the state, but through a 
Reform von oben, in which the society of estates (the Ständegesellschaft) would not be completely 
overturned. Von Humboldt lived in a time in which big and fast-paced societal changes took place. 
The transition from a feudal society to a bourgeois society led to a new meritocratic class, consisting 
of Bildungsbürger who were able to climb the social ladder through education and their unleashing 
of the entrepreneurial spirit.56 Governmental functions were no longer only available for a select 
class of individuals who were born into certain privileged segments of society. Von Humboldt’s 
focus on individual freedoms and rights can be understood in the light of this fast-paced transition. 
On the one hand, he was an organicist who thought that the development of society needed to take 
place by an incremental change of pre-existing structures and hierarchies; Von Humboldt did not 
                                                     
54 Spitta, Die Staatsidee Wilhelm von Humboldts, 187-198. 
55 Von Humboldt wept at the grave of Rousseau during his trip to Paris, another thinker whose relation to 
the Enlightenment can only described as ambivalent. See: Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, 
115. 
56 The change from a stationary society in which every member played the role that was ‘appropriate’ given 
the socio-economic class one was born in to a more dynamic society, in other words: the change from 
ascription to criteria of achievement, can be seen as a crucial feature of the process of modernization. The 
sweeping educational reforms at the beginning of the 19th century were, in this sense, truly modern. See: 
Karl A. Schleunes, “Enlightenment, Reform, Reaction: The Schooling Revolution in Prussia,” Central 
European History 12, no. 4 (1979): 337. 
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seek to radically overthrow the status quo. However, it would be a bit misleading to state that his 
organicist framework puts Von Humboldt in the reactionary camp, since he combines this with a 
strong focus on individual liberties and a highly critical approach to the absolutistic state.  
The defeat of the troops in Jena-Auerstad by the army of Napoleon and the subsequent existential 
crisis of the Prussian state has been connected to Von Humboldt’s decision to join the ranks of 
Stein and his cabinet of reformers.57 The regeneration and the redirection of the Prussian state was 
of utmost importance to the reformers and it was Von Humboldt’s task, as the newly appointed 
head of the Sektion für Kultus und Unterricht im Ministerium des Inneren, to facilitate the agendas 
of the reformers through the professionalization of the educational field and through shaping the 
relations between the state and religious groups. For Von Humboldt, Bildung was a concept that 
had very broad connotations and that could not be limited to its educational meaning alone. That 
being said, Von Humboldt’s attempts to reform the educational sphere echoed the theoretical 
framework that he articulated in the Ideen.  
As we have seen, Von Humboldt had a chance to turn his ideas into practice during a tumultuous 
historical period, which turned out to be very significant for the later development of Prussia. In 
the following paragraphs I will synthesize the diverse strands of the previous enquiry into the 
philosophical roots of Von Humboldt’s theory of the state into a description and analysis of Von 
Humboldt’s ideas about education and his practical activities in this area. Von Humboldt’s call for 
more Bildung, which has richer semantic overtones than the thinner concept of the ‘simple’ and 
mechanical transference of skills or knowledge, in the field of education and science has to be 
primarily understood as a reaction against disciplinary fragmentation and as a way to rethink the 
value of science and education in relation to society. The meaning of Bildung in this scientific and 
pedagogical sense has shifted a lot over time.58 Von Humboldt was mainly concerned with the value 
                                                     
57 Hohendorf, "Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835)," 670. 
58 For an overview of the use of Bildung in political discourse in post-war Germany, see for example: P.U. 
Hohendahl, "Humboldt Revisited: Liberal Education, University Reform, and the Opposition to the 
Neoliberal University," New German Critique 113, 38, no. 2 (2011): 159-196. Hohendahl shows convincingly 
that the notion of Bildung has been used by both proponents and detractors of the status quo. The former 
group argued that the existing educational and scientific institutions already embodied the core values and 
principles of Bildung and needed to be defended against hasty reforms that could endanger the ideal of the 
autonomous university. The latter group, aided by the student movements in the sixties, argued that Bildung 
is compatible with radical and emancipatory calls for democratization. Hohendahl described the conflicting 
discourses about Bildung with great attention for historical details and contexts. However, his work tends 
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of academic pursuits; how can science help aid humans to lead lives that are worthwhile?59 Von 
Humboldt had already defined Bildung as the harmonious development of all faculties. The fact 
that there are many academic disciplines and branches of knowledge seems to be a challenge to the 
individuals who take this task seriously. How could one ever achieve the desired harmony of the 
faculties, if scientifically gained knowledge of the world is disparate and fragmented? Von 
Humboldt proposed to streamline the curriculum of the Gymnasia (the breeding grounds for the 
future generation of academics) without making special provisions or exemptions for different 
classes or estates, making the curriculum more unified.60 This was an ingenious stroke; the reform 
of the curriculum along neohumanistic lines could not only help to present the field of knowledge 
as a unified whole, but also advance broader societal reforms. Von Humboldt was walking a fine 
line between ensuring the continuity of Prussia’s educational system and making education 
available to the lower classes as well, at least in principle.61 Von Humboldt did not only focus on 
the differences and inequalities between individuals and stated that the human worth of both “[d]er 
gemeine Tagelöhner” and “der am feinsten Ausgebildete” should be reaffirmed, by treating their 
                                                     
to conflate the notion of Bildung with the ideal of the university in which research and education are closely 
intertwined. This is just one aspect of the notion of Bildung and this makes that his account is a bit one-
sided; the ideas about individual self-development and freedom that the main actors in his historical 
narrative put forward, disappear in the background. This thesis does not focus on the promises of Bildung 
under conditions of “neoliberalism”, but it might be interesting to try to flesh out whether neoliberalism 
and Bildung are necessarily incompatible, or whether some common denominators can be found.  
59 Von Humboldt’s attempt to conceptualize the unity of the sciences was not an attempt that he undertook 
for its own sake, but rather to advance and facilitate the “Ausbildung der Menschlichkeit, als ein Ganzes”, 
in another word: Bildung. Von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, first volume, 234. 
60 Eric Ashmore, “Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Ideas on the Formation of Character Through Education,” 
Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education 3, no. 1 (1963): 15. 
61 Von Humboldt apparently disliked the term ‘Volksschule’, because this term had proletarian connotations. 
(Idem.) However, the idea that Von Humboldt intended to make education into an elitist and wholly private 
affair is somewhat misleading and a tat anachronistic, because of Von Humboldt’s insistence on the 
universal possibility of Bildung in a time in which this was not a commonly held opinion. For a dissenting 
view, see: Mitchell G. Ash, “Bachelor of What, Master of Whom? The Humboldt Myth and Historical 
Transformations of Higher Education in German-Speaking Europe and the US,” Central European History 
41, no. 2 (2006): 251. 
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sentimental development equally.62 One of Von Humboldt’s most lasting and important decisions 
regarding the field of education was to make university entrance contingent upon the attainment 
of the Abitur, thereby reinforcing the importance of general and, in principle, universal secondary 
education.  
This desire for intellectual unity was not only reflected in Von Humboldt’s attempts to reform 
curricula and to secure the integrity of science, but in his preoccupation with the integrity and 
wholeness of the university as an institutional reality as well. Quite some authors have recently argued 
against what they have called the “Humboldt myth”; the thesis that Von Humboldt almost 
singlehandedly sketched the confines of the institutions of higher education and that the university 
of Berlin was founded upon his writings.63 One of the arguments that has been used against the 
Humboldt Myth is that the humanist conception of the university was developed by many authors, 
such as Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher, Johann Gottlob Fichte and others and 
that Von Humboldt only played a small part in creation of it.64 However, it is a very risky enterprise 
to lump these names together, as if there are no significant theoretical differences between the 
conceptions of education and the university each author espoused. Fichte had no problem at all 
with the involvement and the strict control of the state in educational affairs and exhibited 
authoritarian tendencies in his writings on politics.65 This could not be further removed from the 
modest conception of the state that was endorsed by Von Humboldt. Furthermore, Von Humboldt 
and Schleiermacher differed on a topic that is usually considered to be the hallmark of the 
Humboldtian conception of the university: the unification of research and teaching. Schleiermacher 
proposed that research ought to be the responsibility of independent research institutions, without 
                                                     
62 Wilhelm von Humboldt, cited in: Ute Frevert, “Export/Import: Bildung in der neuen Welt,” in Vom 
Wandel eines Ideals: Bildung, Universität und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, edited by Nikolaus Buschmann and Ute 
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ties to the university.66 So even if it is true that the conception of the university ought to be seen as 
the product of intellectual collaboration, this is no reason to assume that there were no disparities 
between the authors who helped to create it.  
Other attempts to dismantle the ‘Humboldt myth’, for example by insisting on the fact that much 
of the educational infrastructure and practices were already in place before Von Humboldt came 
along and highlighting the fact that much of Von Humboldt’s work on education was entirely 
unknown in the heydays of educational reform in the 19th century, have to be qualified as well.67 
Although it is true that the Ideen were only published long after Von Humboldt’s death, the 
paragraphs that dealt with education were already published in an issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift 
in 1792, long before the educational reforms took place.68 It is a truism that Von Humboldt had to 
work within the context of an institutional structure that already was in place and that much that 
helped to shape the modern German university happened outside of the field of influence of Von 
Humboldt, but that is no reason to entirely dismiss the influence of Von Humboldt’s work and the 
reception of it. As Mitchell G. Ash, a critic of the Humboldt myth, admitted: “‘Humboldt’ is 
symbolic of ideals in which many teachers (and even some students) sincerely believe, and try, 
despite enormous obstacles, to achieve. This is true in particular of the unity of teaching and 
research. Myths need not be lies, but can instead constitute ‘corporate identity’, albeit in the form 
of a ‘counter-utopia’.”69 If it is true that Von Humboldt has become a symbolic point of reference 
for scholars and students who sincerely believed in the commendable nature of Von Humboldt’s 
ideals and if it is furthermore true that these representations constitute “corporate identity”, it is 
safe to conclude that Von Humboldt, albeit indirectly, helped to shape the academic self-
understanding of students and professors alike and the formation of the present-day educational 
infrastructure in developed nations. 
As to the question about the exact nature of the contribution of Von Humboldt opinions are 
divided as well. Whereas Dietrich Spitta tends to stress the consistency within Von Humboldt’s 
oeuvre and his ideological purity as a statesman, other authors have argued that Von Humboldt 
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did not act in line with the ideas that he himself put forward in the Ideen.70 The main difficulty here 
is to ascertain whether Von Humboldt stayed true to his rather thin conception of the state, or 
whether he departed from it. When it came to educational policy Von Humboldt argued that 
although national education had its proper role and function in ancient Greece and Rome, the 
historical and political contexts had changed and education as whole needed to be rethought.71 Von 
Humboldt saw national education as a way to instill order and stability through “moral means” and 
thought it was, for this very reason, quite questionable.72 It is important to note that Von Humboldt 
objected most strongly to a specific type of national education; the type that would stifle the free 
activity of the individual by one-sidedly promoting a definite course of development, instead of 
letting the delicate interplay between the multiplicity of environments and the individual character 
come into fruition.73 When it is furthermore realized that Prussian education was heavily 
underperforming at the time, it might be plausible to assert that Von Humboldt was overstating 
his opposition to national education to voice his dissent and his discontent with the current state 
of affairs. At the end of the 18th century a high amount of the teachers was found to be 
“incompetent” by officials, the facilities were in a poor state and the curriculum was “extremely 
narrow” and heavily focused on religion.74 Furthermore, after the initial efforts by Friedrich 
Wilhelm I and the enlightened despot Friedrich II to modernize the educational system, an 
ultraconservative minister called Johann Christoph von Wöllner tried to reestablish the power of 
the church as a reaction to the growing secularization.75 Von Humboldt’s skepticism about national 
education might partly be explained by his distaste for the reactionary policies of his 
contemporaries that went against his love for individual freedom.   
However true these remarks may be, they do not make for a complete account of the conceptual 
argument Von Humboldt laid down in the Ideen. Von Humboldt’s thesis was not just that the present 
state of affairs concerning national education was deficient, he stated that national education as such 
was, in many ways, incompatible with the limits of the state that he devised. He seemed to think 
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that human beings should in the first place be treated as human beings and only in a secondary and 
derivative sense as citizens.76 The key assumption behind Von Humboldt’s arguments in these lines 
is that state-led education would impose a stifling uniformity upon students, which would lead to 
the waning of the fruitful tension between the human as such and the human as a member of the 
state. In other words: only one side of human existence would be emphasized, leading to one-
sidedness and a reductive conception of the individual. Individuals should, in principle, be free to 
participate in the affairs of the state, but only after they would have developed themselves in a 
broader sense and after they would have attained a higher level of freedom. Von Humboldt 
remarked that the “bürgerliche Einrichtung” could have a detrimental effect on the free unfolding 
of human capacities and that individuals should not be addressed as mere passive subjects of the 
state, but as free agents.77 In a time in which the Prussian government was very concerned with 
maintaining social and cultural order in the wake of the revolutionary happenings in its backyard, 
Von Humboldt was principally concerned, as already pointed out in the previous sections of this 
thesis, with the protection of the individual against the aspirations and the activities of the state. 
Furthermore, Von Humboldt asserted that the development of the nation should be allowed to 
take its course and that the direction of the nation could not be precisely calculated beforehand.78 
This seems to be at odds with his own involvement in the administration that, according to some, 
implemented educational reforms that led to the increase of regulation by the state, by replacing 
private and religious educational institutions with publicly sponsored ones.79 The government 
further increased the reach of the state by making state examinations obligatory, in order to test 
the competence of teachers of the Gymnasia, covering philology, history and mathematics.80 
What to make of this tension? One way in which the state can intervene in public affairs, is through 
materially supporting institutions that are a necessary requirement for Bildung. Dietrich Spitta 
observed that although Von Humboldt tried to determine the proper role the state should play, he 
did not write explicitly about the financial aspects of education in the Ideen.81 If we look at Von 
Humboldt’s proposals in 1809/1810, we see that he consistently argued for the transfer of the 
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powers of spending and organization to the nation.82 The improvement of the Landschulen could 
largely be attained through the involvement of the local municipalities and urban communities, 
which were not unlike the Nationalanstalten Von Humboldt already mentioned in the Ideen. The 
financial means for these reforms would be secured by establishing funds that would be maintained 
by these same communities and not by the state. In support of these proposals, Von Humboldt 
used the same argumentation as he used in the Ideen; if education would primarily be an issue of 
local communities – dynamic webs of individuals that are based on free consent and not on the 
monopoly of violence – individuals would be more inclined to take responsibility for their own 
actions and for taking care of collective goods. However, this does not mean that Von Humboldt 
thought that educational institutions should yield to the demands of the ‘free market’. Although 
Von Humboldt wanted to make educational institutions financially independent from the state, he 
did not want to make education overtly dependent on economic interests either.83 One of the key 
characteristics of the idea of ‘Humboldtian education’, putting the questions about the veracity of 
the ‘Humboldt myth’ aside, has always been that the focus should not lie on vocational training, 
which can be understood as a preparation for a determined position in society. In his proposals for 
the reform of the Prussian educational system, he rigorously excluded vocational training from the 
core responsibilities of the schools and the university.84 Underlying this choice was Von 
Humboldt’s belief that it would be easier to acquire specific skills if one would already have a well-
rounded character than the other way around.85 He readily acknowledged that society needed 
craftsmen, but he objected to the dominance of vocational training in a curriculum that should be 
based on broader humanistic ideals. 
At a first glance it seems to be the case that the objection against exclusively vocational training 
was more of a loose theoretical guideline than an absolute imperative. Von Humboldt was often 
quite lenient: some schools could continue providing vocational training, such as the Ritterakademie 
in Liegnitz. Von Humboldt apparently made this exception to secure the support of the local 
gentry.86 However, interpreting these exceptions as evidence for the thesis that Von Humboldt did 
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not act upon his own ideals is unwarranted. One could argue that Von Humboldt’s willingness to 
compromise on certain points was only indicative of an acquired sensibility for finding a balance 
between implementing reforms and respect for the status quo. In the case of the Liegnitz academy, 
for example, Von Humboldt introduced mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history and, of 
course, Greek to the curriculum in order to consolidate the status of this particular Gymnasium as 
a transitional institution that would prepare students for the entry into university.87 One could 
wonder whether these changes would have been possible if Von Humboldt would have enforced 
his own ideals on the school in Liegnitz without considering the local sensitivities, the pre-existing 
privileges and the peculiar history of the formation of the institution. Furthermore, it would be a 
mistake to overlook the tensions within the Prussian cabinet and assume that Von Humboldt’s rule 
was a pure expression of his individual will. The administration was divided over a couple of issues 
and it is possible that some of these divisions expressed themselves as ambivalence in the actions 
of its members. Von Humboldt and Hardenberg, the Prussian state chancellor, were political rivals 
and Friedrich Ferdinand Alexander zu Dohna-Schlobitten criticized Von Humboldt because of his 
perceived “lack of religious understanding”.88 Furthermore, Von Humboldt might have been 
willing to compromise to not upset his more conservative colleagues. If it is true that Von 
Humboldt changed his course due to tactical maneuvering within a political playing field that was 
marred by conflicting demands, some voices calling for a return to orthodoxy and other voices 
calling for modernization and reforms, Von Humboldt’s ‘failure’ to directly translate his theoretical 
principles into practice might be reframed as a conscious and strategical decision. It need not be 
true that Von Humboldt’s failure was a “tragedy” or that it ought to be viewed as a manifestation 
of the “irony of destiny”.89  
The case of the school in Liegnitz highlights a curious continuity between the ideal of the individual 
appropriation of the ideal of Bildung and the way in which Von Humboldt envisioned the proper 
limits of the state. Not only should one act free and autonomously in the personal sphere, the 
values that are enshrined in the notion of Bildung should be incorporated into the public sphere too. 
The main thing Von Humboldt tried to establish was the autonomy and the free development of 
the Bildungswesen, so that individuals and the nation as a whole could reap the benefits. Von 
Humboldt did not only articulate the ideal of Bildung in his proposals for curricula and in his 
reflections on the relation between teacher and student; Bildung became a model for the 
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institutional and legal standing of primary schooling, the Gymnasia and the university. The parallels 
between Von Humboldt’s early writings on the limits of the state and his theoretical and practical 
preoccupations with educational reform are salient. The state should function as a bulwark of 
autonomy and should create the conditions under which free development could be realized. In a 
strict sense, the creation of a public university stands in tension with the commitment to a limited 
state, but the question here is one of focus and priorities, rather than one of ideological purity. 
Compared to the state of affairs in which religious institutions had a monopoly on educational 
matters, the creation of public institutions does not seem to tread back on the promise of 
autonomy. Besides that, public funding could, from the viewpoint of Von Humboldt, eventually 
be phased out and material assistance could finally become a responsibility of the nation. 
5. A critical assessment of the idea that Bildung as a ‘limiting factor’ 
 
In order to be able to critically assess Von Humboldt’s conception of the relationship between 
Bildung and the state, it is necessary to note that he based his views on politics upon his broader 
conception of human beings and especially upon his account of the ways in which individuals 
participate in the intersubjective realm. Therefore, I will begin this section with a critical appraisal 
of the general outlines of Von Humboldt’s thoughts on (the formation of) subjectivity as such. To 
do this, I will test Von Humboldt’s key assumptions against a few counterarguments. Further on 
in this section, I will move on to a criticism of Von Humboldt’s conception of the relation between 
Bildung and the state more properly. 
Von Humboldt’s concept of Bildung is very rich and can help to conceptualize the development 
of the individual, without resorting to individualism.90 Individuals are not isolated and static beings, 
but are embedded within larger cultural and political structures, such as the state and, more 
importantly, the nation. Von Humboldt pictured the nation to be a dynamic whole, in which the 
independent ‘parts’ (e.g.: the individuals) voluntarily support each other. This organicist metaphor 
of society is modeled upon the organicist conception of the individual; the individual is 
conceptualized as a being that is confronted with a bewildering array of external circumstances, 
which need to be appropriated and are to be seen under the light of one’s character. Lewis P. 
Hinchman states that the organic conception of the self should be revised, in order to make room 
for a more “dynamic” view of individuality. He states that the organic conception of individuality 
presupposes that there is a unique and natural core of the self. The key assumption behind this 
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view is that the organic conception of the self presupposes a more or less static biological baseline 
that resists change; a biological whatness. According to Hinchman, this conception suffers from a 
serious flaw, since it is incompatible with the view that the self is always something that is 
constituted by a complex series of mediations through cultural conventions and contexts. 
Hinchman’s project can be seen as an attempt to develop an ontological framework in which the 
intersubjectively shared symbolical realm is prior to individuated human existence. Hinchman’s 
conceptualization of the development of individuality departs from the key assumption that 
persons are not born with a fixed set of preferences and wishes. Hinchman states, in effect, that 
there is no such thing as a “natural self” and that the static conception of subjectivity that this 
notion implies hampers a more dynamic understanding of self-cultivation, in which change is not 
conceptualized as a smooth transition between two states, but as something that is fraught with 
discontinuity and disruption.91 By contrast, Von Humboldt placed the notion of Eigenthümlichkeit 
at the center of his theory of Bildung. However, this proprietary aspect of individual existence is 
in no way completely immune to change and is not the same as a naturalistic essence. Von 
Humboldt conceded that acculturation plays a constitutive role in every form of human 
development and avoided, as we have seen, the traps of a one-sided individualistic framework, in 
which the individual would be conceptualized as an isolated entity. However, the freedom to 
develop through cultural exchanges needed, according to Von Humboldt, to be complemented by 
the removal of external constraints that could fetter human flourishing. The culturalistic theory of 
human development that Hinchman supports needs to be complemented with a theory of negative 
freedom, since it is not the case that cultures are necessarily conducive to the growth of the 
individual. Besides being able to develop oneself through culture, one needs to be able to free oneself 
of extraneous forces, such as narrow cultural conventions or omnipresent state apparatuses, that 
stand in the way of a free development of human faculties and the blossoming of one’s specific 
character.  
The fundamental conception of human development that lies at the core of Von Humboldt’s 
conception of society, can be easily seen as an anthropological justification of Von Humboldt’s 
insistence upon a minimal involvement of the state. The state ought to facilitate the development 
of individuals to the fullest extent. Individuals cannot achieve their personal goals if they lack the 
means to do so and if there would not be a legal framework in place. Furthermore, in order to 
figure out who one really is and who one should be, persons need to temporarily overcome the 
world of strict necessity – in which they would only be concerned with their bare survival and the 
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satisfaction of physical needs – and form a conception of themselves, as situated beings, embedded 
within larger cultural structures, capable of purposeful action. In this light, the tensions within Von 
Humboldt’s work come to the fore. Von Humboldt was very reluctant to assign a large role to the 
state, yet he readily acknowledges the fact that in order to purposefully act and pursue life goals, 
individuals need the means that enable them to do so. If the estates and class divisions are not 
allowed to form obstacles to the growth of the individual, the question arises which measures 
should be taken to restructure society, so that the socio-economic background will not 
unequivocally determine the life path of the individual. On some level he realized that 
governmental provision of material assistance to aspiring students would not be necessarily 
incompatible with the principle that every human being should acknowledge the existence of 
individual responsibility. It is possible that some individuals take their responsibilities seriously, 
while being thwarted by overpowering external circumstances which lie beyond the field of 
influence of the individual. In these cases, governmental aid seems to be in line with the core 
responsibility of the state to secure and facilitate Bildung. Thus we can conclude that Von 
Humboldt’s claim only survives in a more modest form: the state has to provide material assistance 
to its citizens, as long as this does not lead to the disappearance of responsibility and initiative on 
the level of the individual.  
This raises the following question: at which point does the material support of the state become 
problematic from the viewpoint of responsible agency and what are the criteria that can be 
developed to establish the minimum amount of aid that is necessary to foster individual 
development? At this stage of the argument, one could either negate the premises of the question 
and depart from Von Humboldt’s works entirely, or adopt either a relatively thin or a relatively thick 
conception of the role of the state. Such conceptions of the state are quite permeable, since these 
positions differ (primarily) in degree. A proponent of the thin conception could argue that the state 
is responsible for the material well-being of its citizens, but that this duty is limited, because too 
much material support would not be conducive to the wider aim of nurturing the development of 
individuals, since it could make citizens too dependent on the help of others and form an incentive 
to abstain from cultivating one’s own abilities and faculties. A proponent of the thick conception 
could place the focus on the idea that humans are highly complex beings that can have a plethora 
of needs and desires and that they possibly will need some extra help from institutions to be able 
to realize their full potential. The underlying disagreement between these two virtual proponents 
of these two positions does not depend on a further disagreement about the possibility of agency, 
but could be related to questions about the efficacy of governmental aid and the exact role that the 
state plays as a facilitator of Bildung. The question about lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In 
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that what follows, I will focus my efforts on the questions about the necessary conditions for 
Bildung and about whether a limited state can perform the tasks that Von Humboldt prescribed 
for it.  
Von Humboldt’s insistence on both the possibility of actual Bildung and the procedural and 
legalistic restraints on the activity of the state causes some tensions. As we have seen, Von 
Humboldt thought that the state should act within the confines that are set out by the nation and 
that individuals should be fully free to leave the nation if they would wish to do so. The key 
principles and criteria that are to be considered when questions about the activities of the state 
arise are societal consent and individual freedom, if we want to stay true to Von Humboldt’s core 
values and if we want to secure the autonomy of individuals and larger cultural wholes. However, 
there are cases in which the protection of these key principles seems to undermine itself. For 
example, Von Humboldt thought that individuals who would want to exercise a certain profession 
are free to decline the state-sanctioned test that publicly determines whether they would be 
qualified to do so, without any consequence for the possibility to exercise special professions. In 
Von Humboldt’s defense an argument can be made that the responsibilities of the state end when 
the state showed which individuals are certainly qualified. It is up to individuals to decide whether 
they want to take the risk to enjoy the services of somebody that did not undergo the state 
examinations. This option is compatible with both freedom of choice and the principle of 
individual responsibility and could help the state to avoid sustaining and enabling a potentially idle 
citizenry. However, if one agrees to a thin positive duty for the state to protect its citizens from 
charlatans who could take advantage of their unknowingness by providing optional testing, one 
does not oppose the protection by the state as such, but rather the excesses of these protective 
measures. The main difference between thin and thick positive duties to protect seems to be a difference 
in degree and emphasis and not one in kind. In other words; the principle that was espoused by 
Von Humboldt could turn out to be a very lenient one; the practical realization and the precise 
determination of the involvement of the state could turn out to be more or less paternalistic, 
without violating the requirement of limiting the activities of the state as much as possible.  
The underlying conundrum is related to utopian strands in the work of Von Humboldt. Von 
Humboldt’s proposals to reform the educational sphere were largely shaped by a much broader 
worldview and although Von Humboldt was a pragmatic statesman that was more inclined to 
compromise than to fiery polemics, the sketches and designs for the future reorganization of 
society were quite far-reaching. Von Humboldt’s repeated focus on the autonomy of the individual 
and the nation and his distrust of governmental aid lead to a conceptual dependency on the notion 
of a societal capacity to autonomously regulate and maintain public institutions, such as the 
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university and the Gymnasia. Nowadays it would be preposterous to believe that mass-education 
could be entirely funded by well-intentioned philanthropists and exemplary individuals who would 
be willing to set their private interests aside in order to advance the cause of other, less fortunate 
individuals and the nation as a whole. It is possible that the minimalistic approach to the state could 
lead to the disintegration of societal ties and not to the desired strengthening of bonds, based on 
voluntary association. The necessity of the safeguarding of the rights of the individual 
notwithstanding; the requirement that every individual should give consent to every affair that 
concerns the nation is too strict to guarantee the smooth and swift exercise of collective power. In 
order to guarantee this, collective power should be more or less coordinated, within the confines 
of the constitutional limitation of the possibility to coerce or steer individuals. In this area, the state 
could assume its responsibilities to create the conditions for Bildung. 
If we transpose this concern to a consideration of Von Humboldt’s proposals for the reform of 
educational institutions, we could conclude that the state is not given enough means to guarantee 
the implementation of its core mission. If Bildung should be, in principle, ‘attainable’ by everyone 
and not merely by self-serving elites, the state cannot stand by idly and hope for a smooth 
distribution of opportunities. These opportunities for Bildung are not entirely determined by 
material circumstances and the realization of one’s full potential requires an active disposition to 
supersede oneself on the part of the individual. If, however, it is impossible to realize oneself to 
the fullest extent due to external circumstances, it is necessary that the state provides assistance, 
although it of course remains an open question to what degree. Thus, the leveling of curricula 
might not be sufficient. Some individuals from the lower classes could fall behind. Not because 
they would be bad students or incapable of self-development, but because of the absence of the 
conditions that are required for Bildung. It is difficult to strive for spiritual perfection when one is 
struggling to put food on the table to survive. A vague hope in the ability of individuals to support 
each other without the involvement of the state can lead to a blindness to the necessity of the 
fulfilment of the basic material conditions of autonomous subsistence, both in a spiritual and a 
material sense.  
Freedom is, according to Von Humboldt, the bedrock of Bildung. As we have seen, freedom is 
only possible if individuals are able to lead autonomous lives and if external circumstances do not 
dictate their life paths entirely. A state that would retain an anti-interventionist stance at all costs, 
runs the risk of preserving the conditions that unduly hamper individuals that sincerely wish to 
achieve excellence. As late as 1990, only 5% of the people who received their Abitur, still a 
prerequisite for university-entry in Germany, were raised in traditional working class 
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environments.92 One of the reasons that the researchers gave for this low percentage was that the 
cultural environments these people were born into did not favor, let alone incentivize, personal 
decisions to continue with higher forms of education. This example concentrates upon the 
situation within a developed and affluent nation like Germany. In conditions of extreme poverty it 
seems even more likely that external cultural environments exert a great deal of pressure upon 
individuals to refrain from developing academic careers, at best favoring ‘more practical’ vocational 
training instead, or no form of education at all. This form of pressure would not be a problem, 
were it not that these pressures potentially disregard the wishes of the individual. Within more 
authoritarian environments, these pressures could even amount to a variance of coercion. In these 
cases the wishes of the community could be unilaterally imposed upon the individual, through 
cultural means, or otherwise; it could even be possible that cultural surroundings could, quite 
literally, starve individuals of higher aspirations. In these more extreme cases, the freedom from 
culture that is a condition for Bildung would be lacking or even wholly non-existent. Material 
assistance to at least some of those who are lesser off, can aid them to escape their immediate 
surroundings and to realize the promise of self-cultivation. Thus, it would be conceptually sound 
to state that Bildung just might require a relatively bigger state that has a positive duty to ameliorate 
the lives of individuals, without resorting to authoritarian paternalism.   
6. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have shown that it is possible to discern a continuity between Von Humboldt’s 
earlier work and his activities during his political career, especially concerning educational reform. 
Von Humboldt placed the concept of Bildung at the core of his theory of the state, as expressed 
in the Ideen. According to him, the sole purpose of the limited state should be the provision of a 
basic level of security, in order to facilitate individuals in their search of Bildung, thereby avoiding 
the pitfalls of anarchic individualism. Von Humboldt did not retort to a facile individualism, yet he 
devised a carefully designed corpus of constitutional principles to protect individuals against the 
possibly arbitrary coercion from the state. At first sight, this apparent wariness of what could be 
called ‘big government’ seems incompatible with the reforms of Prussia’s educational system that 
took place under his supervision, only years after the revolutionary events in Prussia’s neighbor 
country began to unfold. Given the state of education at the time and the lack of clear educational 
                                                     
92 Klaus Schönhoven, “Chancengleichheit für Arbeiterkinder? Zur Bedeutung des zweiten Bildungsweges 
für den sozialen Aufstieg in der Bundesrepublik,” in Vom Wandel eines Ideals: Bildung, Universität und Gesellschaft 
in Deutschland, edited by Nikolaus Buschmann and Ute Planert (Bonn: Dietz, 2010), 70. 
 
37 
 
policy and standards, it was deemed necessary by Von Humboldt to streamline the curriculum of 
the Gymnasia, to make this curriculum more conducive to individual development – departing 
from the notion that education is nothing more or less than the transferal of practical skills or the 
passive acquiescence of knowledge –  and to implement new measures that were devised to increase 
the accessibility of education. Under his supervision, a new requirement was introduced: only 
people that attained their Abitur would be allowed university-entry. However, these alleged 
inconsistencies between the ideas that Von Humboldt put forward in the Ideen and his practical 
activities as a statesman should not be exaggerated or overemphasized, since his fundamental 
commitment to his substantive conception of Bildung remained untouched. In his institutional 
proposals, he made room for extensive and autonomous cooperation between students and teacher 
and for an intimate intertwinement of research and education, further institutionalizing the open-
ended search for knowledge and self-development that takes place in quotidian life as well. Von 
Humboldt never regarded the limitation of state powers as a goal in itself. Rather, the state should 
be limited in order to secure Bildung. If Von Humboldt changed his mind in this area, he principally 
changed his mind about his methods and certainly not about the ultimate goals. This shows how 
fundamental Bildung was for Von Humboldt.  
In the second part of this thesis, I critically analyzed Von Humboldt’s conception of the limited 
state, in relation to Bildung. It remains an open question to which extent the state should intervene 
to facilitate Bildung, precisely because it is a very difficult task to balance the need for individual 
responsibility and social security. The main difficulty here is whether one should adopt a thin or a 
thick conception of the responsibilities of the state. However, it seems very plausible that Bildung 
requires a material substrate and if it is the role of the state to advance Bildung, the state should 
provide at least a basic amount of material assistance. Material support can pave the way to a 
protection of the individual against forces that are outside of the direct sphere of influence. 
Individuals should strive to take matters into their own hands, but if external circumstances limit 
individuals in their quest for Bildung to a very large extent, state intervention might be warranted. 
From the perspective of Von Humboldt’s conception Bildung, it is not desirable to enforce equality 
in every regard, since this could possibly spell trouble for individual development, but this is not to 
state that the state should turn a blind eye to potentially stifling sources of inequality altogether, 
because this could lead to a severe limitation of individual freedom by keeping systemic unfairness 
in place and by exacerbating the privileges of certain social groups. In conclusion: from the 
perspective of Von Humboldt’s conception of Bildung, one should opt for a critical acceptance of 
state powers and material assistance. The case of (extreme) poverty is an example that could 
warrant state intervention from the perspective of Bildung.  
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Von Humboldt, Wilhelm. Werke in fünf Bänden. Five volumes. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1960. 
Wulf, Christoph. "Perfecting the Individual: Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Concept of Anthropology, 
Bildung and Mimesis." Educational Philosophy and Theory 35, no. 2 (2003): 241-249. 
 
 
 
